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ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
Writing in Dobbs, the Court was adamant in its support of the
complete record doctrine as set forth in Gardner. The Court added little
new law in this opinion because the case is premised on rather unusual
facts. However, Dobbs does provide defense counsel with additional
support for arguing the importance of a complete record upon appeal.
Therefore, defense counsel facing obstacles upon appeal with supple-
menting the record will want to use Gardner in conjunction with Dobbs
to argue that the appellate court must have a full record before it in order
to decide the case.
Summary and analysis by:
Roberta F. Green
GARDNER v. DIXON
1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 28147
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
In September 1983, John Sterling Gardner was convicted of first-
degree murder in the deaths of two restaurant workers during a robbery.
The court imposed the death penalty. The North Carolina Supreme Court
affirmed both the conviction and sentence on direct appeal, and the
United States Supreme Court denied review.1 Gardnercommenced state
habeas proceedings but was denied relief.2 Gardner then filed a writ of
habeas corpus in federal court. Both the district court and the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals denied relief.3 Gardner's requests forrehearing
were denied.
In August 1992, Gardner filed a motion for relief from the federal
district court's judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. 4 Gardner specifically requested relief under Rule
60(b)(2) and (6) and submitted supporting affidavits which he claimed
showed newly discovered evidence of alcohol and drug abuse by his
attorney, Bruce Fraser, during his murder trial and sentencing. Gardner's
execution was stayed by the Superior Court of Forsyth County until
October 23, 1992.
The district court denied Gardner's motion for relief and Gardner
appealed to the Fourth Circuit. He also filed an application for a stay
of execution and a certificate of probable cause to appeal the district
court's ruling.
HOLDING
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's
ruling and denied Gardner's request for a stay of execution. 5 Noting the
"difficulty of prevailing on successive habeas petitions' 6, the court
specifically addressed the use of a Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule
60(b) motion as "the newest weapon in capital-habeas litigation, in part
because it has the tendency to compel a court to address a petitioner's
1 State v. Gardner, 319 S.E.2d 591, 594-96 (N.C. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1230 (1985).
2 Gardner v. State, 361 S.E.2d 598 (N.C. 1986), cert. denied, 486
U. S. 1061 (1987).
3 Gardner v.Dixon, No. 91-4010,slipop. at 19 (unpublished), 1992
U.S. App. LEXIS 12971 (4th Cir. June 4, 1992). See case summary of
Gardner, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No. 1, p. 30 (1992).
4 Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) provides, in pertinent part: "On motion and
upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or aparty's legal
representative from a final judgment, order or proceeding for the follow-
ing reasons: ... (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence
could not have been discovered in time to move fora new trial under Rule
59(b);... (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for
reasons (1), (2), and (3) notmore than one year after the judgment, order
claims on the merits. '7 In conformity with its treatment of an appeal of
a Rule 60(b) denial in Jones v. Murray8 , the court treated Gardner's
appeal as: "(1) a petition for writ of habeas corpus, (2) a successive
petition, and (3) a legitimate Rule 60(b) motion addressing the final
judgment of the district court." 9
The court held: (1) because Gardner failed to show cause and
prejudice or actual innocence, his claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel was procedurally barred; 10 (2) Gardner's claim failed under the
abuse of the writ doctrine because he did not present the alleged new
evidence in his prior habeas petition and he failed to show cause and
prejudice or actual innocence; 11 and (3) the district court did not err in
denying relief under Rule 60(b) because there is no evidence the outcome




As the Fourth Circuit noted, it is very difficult for a petitioner to
prevail in successive habeas corpus petitions. In its treatment of
Gardner's petition as both a writ of habeas corpus and a successive
petition, the court illustrated its point.
The Fourth Circuit found that Gardner's habeas claim was
procedurally barred by North Carolina General Statute Section 15A-
1419(a)(3), which provides that a motion for appropriate relief may be
denied if "upon a previous appeal the defendant was in a position to
adequately raise the ground or issue underlying the present motion but
did not do so."' 13 Similarly, in treating Gardner's petition as a successive
habeas petition, the Fourth Circuit relied upon the standards of review set
forth in McCleskey v. Zant.14 Under McCleskey, in order to excuse a
failure to raise a claim in a prior habeas petition, a petitioner must show
cause for failing to raise it or show that a "fundamental miscarriage of
justice would result from a failure to entertain the claim."
'15
or proceeding was entered or taken."
5 Gardner v. Dixon, No. 92-4013 (unpublished), 1992 U.S. App.
LEXIS 28147, at*2 (4th Cir. October 21, 1992). Gardner was executed
by lethal injection on October 23, 1992.
6 Id. at *7.
7 Id. at *8.
8 976 F.2d 169 (4th Cir. 1992). See case summary of Jones, Capital
Defense Digest, this issue.
9 Gardner, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 28147, at *8-*9.
10 Id. at *9-*10.
11 Id. at*10-*15.
12 Id. at *35-*36.
13 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1419(a)(3) (Michie 1992).
14 111 S.Ct. 1454 (1991).
15 Id. at 1470.
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Gardner attempted to show that he could not have discovered the
new evidence about his attorney's drug abuse at the time of his prior
petition because he could not compel his attorney's former wife to give
testimony and because he had been unaware of Fraser's problems. The
Fourth Circuit refused to accept these excuses as just cause for his failure
to raise the issue earlier. The court specifically doubted Gardner's
allegation of ignorance of the abuse: "[W]e find it peculiarly interesting
that Gardner never previously raised this allegation that Fraser was
suffering from alcohol or cocaine abuse during his representation-
where such abuse would have been pellucidly obvious to those individu-
als, including Gardner, connected with the trial and sentencing."' 16 The
court also pointed to evidence that Gardner's current counsel knew of
Fraser's abuse as early as 1986.17
The court also found that the dismissal of Gardner's petition would
not result in a miscarriage ofjustice. The court noted that in order to show
a fundamental miscarriage of justice, Gardner must show that he was
"actually innocent" of the death penalty. 18 The court concluded that
Gardner's new evidence failed to meet this burden because it "does not
attack any aggravating circumstance or other eligibility provision for the
death penalty, but rather attacks the quantum of mitigating evidence that
was before the jury."
19
Because of the recognized difficulty in prevailing on habeas peti-
tions, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) is now being used to force
the reviewing court to consider the merits of a petitioner's claims. In
order to prevail on a claim of newly discovered evidence, a party must
show that the evidence: "(1) is material and not merely cumulative, (2)
could not have been timely discovered through the exercise of due
diligence, and (3) would probably have changed the outcome embodied
in the judgment."
20
In Gardner's case, his "newly discovered evidence" took the form
of numerous affidavits supporting his claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel by showing that Fraser, his attorney, suffered drug and alcohol
impairment during the time of his representation of Gardner. The court's
opinion detailed the substance of some of those affidavits. First, the court
reviewed the affidavit of Bruce Fraser's former wife:
3. At the same time that Bruce was involved in the use and
sale of drugs, he maintained a law practice in Winston-Salem.
Bruce had a tendency to go on binges and his law cases would
sufferbecause of this. By binges, I mean that Bruce would use
drugs all night and sometimes for days on end....
4. I recall when Bruce was appointed as counsel for the
defense in the John Gardner case... [O]n one occasion, I drove
Bruce to the jail to visit with Gardner. I often drove Bruce
when he was not able to drive because of either having used
too much cocaine or because he was afraid of getting a DUL.
6. At the time ... ,as well as during the entire time that he
was on the Gardner case, Bruce had a serious addiction to
cocaine. He used cocaine and alcohol on a daily basis. Bruce
would call home from his office to say that he was on his way
home. Then, I would not see him for as much as three days at
a time. Bruce would go for days without sleep and without
eating during these periods.
16 Gardner, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 28147, at *14.
17 Id.
18 "[T]o show 'actual innocence' one must show by clear and
convincing evidence that but for a constitutional error, no reasonable
juror would have found the petitioner eligible for the death penalty under
the applicable state law." Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S.Ct. 2514, 2517
(1992). See case summary of Sawyer, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 5,
8. During the week of the Gardner trial, there was a small
party at our house with about 6 other people present. There
was a great deal of cocaine being used and a lot of alcohol
being used.... Bruce continued to drink and use cocaine the
rest of the night. The next morning, Bruce was so loaded that
he couldn't drive. I had to drive Bruce to the courthouse so that
he could appear for the Gardner trial.
9. At the time of the Gardner trial, Bruce had been counsel
for the Hell's Angels .... During the Gardner trial, it was
speculated in the press that the Hell's Angels had something
to do with the murders for which Gardner was later convicted.
... Mark (who I understood to be the President of the Hell's
Angels) discussed this with Bruce at our house. Mark said he
didn't like all the bad press that the Hell's Angels were getting
around the murders. I remember Bruce told Mark that
Gardner was a loser and that he would be found guilty .... 
2 1
Another affidavit was submitted by Fraser's babysitter from 1981
to 1983 (Gardner's trial was in 1983):
4. I know the Frasers were serious drug users during the
period between 1981 through 1983 ... :
a. They would not return from their nights out until 3 or
4:00 in the morning, even on the weeknights. When they
would arrive, they would be drunk and stoned. I could smell
the alcohol, smell the marijuana and see theirbloodshot eyes.
Also, they would act as if they did not know where they were.
b. They would leave the butt ends of marijuana cigarettes
("roaches") in their ashtrays. I was a passenger in Bruce
Fraser's car many times and observed "roaches" in his car
ashtrays. His car reeked of marijuana.
c. When they would return from a car trip, I could see
and smell the marijuana smoke pouring out of the car
when they would open the doors....
d. On one occasion in 1981 or 1982, 1 accidentally discov-
ered under their doormat a plastic sandwich bag half-filled
with cocaine....
e. When I would clean their home, I would find thousands
of dollars (sometimes as much as $5,000 - 6,000) and bags of
pot stuffed in drawers and in closets.
g. I am aware of Bruce Fraser's reputation in the neighbor-
hood from 1981 through 1983 and thereafter. It wascommon
knowledge that Bruce Fraser was a "coke head," which
means that he stayed high on cocaine.
22
No. ,p. 18 (1992).
1 Gardner, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 28147, at *15.
20 Id. at *17.
21 Id. at *18-*20 (quoting Petitioner's Motion for Relief from
Judgment, Exh. 2, pp. 3-4).
22 Id. at *20-*22 (quoting Akers' Affidavit attached to Petitioner's
Objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation).
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A third and fourth affidavit came from two of Fraser's neighbors
from 1981 through 1985, stating that "they had seen Fraser intoxicated,
'reeking of marijuana,' and impaired by drugs."'2 3
Another affidavit was submitted by an attorney who had been co-
counsel with Fraser on a number of criminal cases in the early 1980's:
It was common knowledge among the profession that during
the early 1980's Bruce Fraser had a substance abuse problem
... I had several candid discussions with Bruce about
changing his pattern of substance abuse which I feared was
and would continue to harm his personal and professional life.
His inability to change his personal habits was very sad to me.
It was at this time that my active professional relationship with
Bruce ceased .... 24
Gardner also submitted the affidavit of a psychiatrist specializing in
substance abuse disorders, who stated:
A significant disabling impact of a substance abuse problem
is not limited to a situation where the professional is ingesting
the mind-and-behavior-altering substances while actually
engaging in the practice or profession. Rather, "repeated use
of cocaine produces subacute mental impairment that persists
for substantial duration, even after the acute 'high' has
abated."25
In its response to the motion, the state submitted twelve affidavits.
The court briefly summarized the contents of the affidavits:
Superior Court Judge George M. Fountain presided at
Gardner's trial. He observes that Fraser was "pleasant,
affable ... businesslike... fully lucid and sharp".... Judge
Fountain recalls "nothing during the trial which suggests that
Mr. Fraser was impaired due to alcohol, drugs, lack of sleep,
or injury." He attests that he "certainly would not have
allowed any lawyer to go forward in any case, especially a
capital one, if the lawyer appeared in the least impaired."
'26
Other persons who observed Fraser at close range during the
course of the proceedings confirm the fact that Fraser dis-
played absolutely no sign of substance abuse. The affiants
state vigorously that Fraser was "punctual," professional,"
"articulate," "knowledgeable," "thorough," and "effective"
in his representation of Gardner.... 27
Fraser's long-time legal secretary avers that Fraser's serious
drug problems arose in 1985, not in 1983. She states, "if
Bruce Fraser had been substantially impaired by alcohol or
drugs during the preparation and trial of the Gardner trial, I
believe I would have known about it .... 28
After reviewing the above evidence, the court assumed, without
deciding, that "this 'newly discovered evidence' is material.., and could
23 Id. at *22 (quoting Affidavit of John Nieschwitz and Affidavit
of Joyce Nieschwitz attached to Petitioner's Objections to the Magistrate
Judge's Report and Recommendation).
24 Id. at *22-*23 (quoting Affidavit of Joseph Cheshire, V).
25 Id. at *23 (quoting Brown Affidavit attached to Petitioner's
Objections to the Magistrate's Report and Recommendation).
26 Id. at *24-*25 (quoting Fountain Affidavit, attached to State's
Response to Petitioner's Motion for Rule 60(b) Relief).
27 Id. at *25 (quoting affidavits from the court reporter at trial, the
bailiff, the prosecutors, Fraser's law clerk, and the jury foreman).
not have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence." 29 The
court was then left with the question whether the new evidence would
have dictated a different result in the district court's prior ruling.
In order to show that he received ineffective assistance of counsel,
Gardner had to demonstrate that: (1) "counsel's representation fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness"; 30 and (2) "there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different." 31
The court admitted that in its prior review of Gardner's case,
when it considered Fraser's representation without allegations of drug
use, it had concluded that "whether Fraser acted reasonably under the
circumstances surrounding his representation of Gardner presented a
close question."'32 But the court was not convinced that Gardner's new
evidence now made Fraser's representation ineffective. The court
dismissed Gardner's evidence of drug and alcohol abuse by his
attorney by finding that "Gardner simply does not identify, in any way
or manner, any action that Fraser could have taken to enhance his
chance of success. '33 The court took the position that none of the new
evidence related to Fraser's actual performance at the trial and that the
state's affidavits actually supported the finding of a competent perfor-
mance by Fraser. Therefore, the court ruled that its prior finding of
reasonable representation by Fraser would not be affected by Gardner's
new evidence.
34
The court further found that "there also has been no showing that
the alleged substance abuse by Fraser resulted in prejudice to
Gardner. '35 The court found that the fact that Fraser may have failed
to present certain mitigating evidence to the jury during the sentencing
phase would not have altered the outcome. The fact that he may have
failed to present such evidence because he was drug or alcohol
impaired made no difference to the court: "[W]ithout direct evidence
that the result would have been a sentence of less than death, we are
constrained to conclude there was no prejudice and the claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel is without merit."
'36
The Fourth Circuit's apparent willingness to consider a Rule
60(b) motion in the capital context is quickly obliterated by its refusal
to recognize Gardner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
What is disturbing is that even once the court treated the allegations of
drug abuse as true, it was unwilling to find that such abuse tipped the
scales to ineffectiveness in a case where the court had already found
the issue of ineffectiveness to be a "close one." The fact that court
participants did not see obvious signs of drug abuse does not answer
the question of what Fraser did not do because of his drug habits.
Indeed, his drug abuse may even have enhanced his self-esteem and
given him a false sense of security and confidence in pursuing his
practice. But just such a heightened sense of confidence may have
directly led to Fraser's failure to fully and adequately * tigate all
possible mitigating evidence to be presented on Gardner's behalf
during the sentencing phase.
If Fraser were drug or alcohol impaired at any time during his
representation of Gardner, either before or during the trial, then he
could not fully rely upon his faculties in preparing, investigating and
defending the case. A drug-impaired attorney hardly can be deemed
capable of making conscious judgments on behalf of any client,
28 Id. (quoting Reece Affidavit, attached to State's Response to
Petitioner's Motion for Rule 60(b) Relief).
29 Id. at *27.
30 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).
31 Id. at 694.
32 Gardner, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 28147, at *28.
33 Id. at *29.
34 Id. at *30.
35 Id. at *30.
36 Id. at 35.
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particularly one who is facing the death penalty. If the affidavits
presented by Gardner are true, then he was denied the assistance of
counsel who was in complete control of his mental and physical
capacities and who was fully capable of exercising the skills his training
afforded.
37
If the court had been presented with evidence Fraser had never
attended law school or passed the bar, and his performance had been the
same in this case, would the court still hold that Gardner received
effective assistance of counsel? If the answer to that question is no, as
one would assume, the court's ruling would not hinge on Fraser's
courtroom performance, but instead would focus on his lack of education
and formal training upon which he could rely in representing his clients.
37 It is interesting to note that despite the court's conclusion here
that Fraser was not ineffective in Gardner's case, Fraser was suspended
from the practice of law in 1990 for a period of three years on unrelated
matters. However, the Order of Discipline from the Disciplinary Hearing
Commission of the North Carolina State Bar, No. 89 DHC D2, specifi-
cally found that Fraser was an alcoholic and was abusing alcohol and
using illegal drugs in 1988 and 1989, that his "misconduct constituted a
The concern would be that he did not do all that a properly trained lawyer
would have done in the case and, therefore, the adversarial system had
broken down.
If an attorney is unable to rely upon his education and training
because of drug impairment, is the situation really any different? The
result should be the same. If the attorney is not able to call upon the proper
education and training with which to represent a criminal client's
interests, for whatever reason, then the client, and the judicial system,
have been adversely affected and justice demands the opportunity for a
new trial.
Summary and Analysis By:
Susan F. Henderson
pattern of neglect and failure to communicate," and that he had received
a prior Private Reprimand for neglect in 1983. The Complaint filed by
the North Carolina State Bar in that matter also alleged that Fraser was
convicted of driving while impaired in 1985, 1988, and 1989. Fraserwas
disbarred on January 13, 1993, as the result of complaints alleging that
he misappropriated client funds in 1989 and 1990.
JONES v. MURRAY
976 F.2d 169 (4th Cir. 1992)
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
Following his conviction on two counts of capital murder, Willie
LeRoy Jones was sentenced to death in January 1984. As Jones had no
prior criminal record, the prosecution in the case argued only one
aggravating factor: Jones' conduct was "outrageously or wantonly vile,
horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or an
aggravated battery to the victim."1
Testimony given at Jones' trial indicated that in May 1983,
Graham and Myra Adkins, an elderly couple living in Charles City
County, were found murdered and incinerated in their home. Graham
Adkins had been shot in the face at close range and had apparently died
from that wound prior to the fire. Myra Adkins, on the other hand, had
received a non-fatal head wound and, after having been bound,
gagged, set on fire, and left in a closet, died of smoke inhalation. Both
Mr. and Mrs. Adkins had been doused with accelerant, as had been
their home. Also found on the premises was a safe with its door
removed and its contents missing.
After Jones' conviction was upheld by the Virginia Supreme
Court,2 the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. 3 Jones then
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Virginia state courts,
which was denied, as was his appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court4 and
1 See Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.2 (1990).
2 Jones v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 427, 323 S.E.2d 554, 554
(1984).
3 Jones v. Virginia, 472 U.S. 1012 (1985).
4 Jones v. Bair, No. 86-1152 (June 15, 1987).
5 Jones v. Bair, 484 U.S. 959, 108 S. Ct. 358 (1987).
6 Jones' motion was made pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e).
7 Jones v. Murray, 947 F.2d 1106 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 1591 (1992). See case summary of Jones, Capital Defense Digest,
Vol. 4, No. 2, p. 5 (1992).
8 Jones v. Murray, 112 S. Ct. 1591 (1992).
9 Jones v. Murray, 112 S. Ct. 2295 (1992).
his petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.5 Subse-
quently, Jones filed a habeas petition in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia, which, after a report from the
magistrate, was denied. Jones then filed a motion to alter or amend the
judgment,6 which also was denied.
Next, Jones filed a notice of appeal to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which affirmed the district court's
judgment.7 Jones then filed a petition for rehearing, which was denied.
He applied again to the United States Supreme Court for a writ of
certiorari, which was denied, 8 as was his petition for rehearing. 9
On August 10, 1992, Jones filed a second state habeas petition,
arguing that Virginia's vileness aggravating factor had been applied to
him in an unconstitutionally vague manner. In support of his position,
Jones cited two recent United States Supreme Court cases: Stringer v.
Black10 and Sochor v. Florida.11 On August 24, 1992, the Common-
wealth filed a motion to dismiss, which the circuit court granted three
days later, finding not only that relitigation of Jones' claim was
procedurally barred under state law, but also that Jones had failed to show
how Stringer and Sochor mandated the relief he sought. On September
8, Jones filed an appeal in the Virginia Supreme Court, which scheduled
oral arguments for September 14, the day before Jones' scheduled
execution.
10 112 S. Ct. 1130 (1992) (reemphasizing that "the use of a vague
or imprecise aggravating factor in the weighing process invalidates the
sentence and at the very least requires constitutional harmless-error
analysis or re-weighing in the state judicial system"). See case summary
of Stringer, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No. 1, p. 11 (1992).
11 112 S. Ct. 2114 (1992) (finding that a trial court may weigh an
impermissibly vague statutory aggravating factor if the highest state
court has previously given constitutionally acceptable narrowing con-
structions of the factor, but that where the sentencer has relied upon an
invalid aggravating circumstance, the reviewing state court must either
independently reweigh the valid factors or apply harmless error analy-
sis). See case summary of Sochor, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No. 1,
p. 11 (1992).
